

Harold Brown Seeks to Assure Senate on Pact Verification

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WASHINGTON, July 18 — Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sought to assure the Senate today that the United States would be able to verify adequately the strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union, but his testimony brought to light unresolved issues and disputes.

Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, said that with current methods of intelligence gathering the United States would "not even come close" to being able to ascertain whether the Russians have violated provisions limiting modifications that might be made in Soviet intercontinental nuclear missiles.

At a public hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, drew from Secretary Brown the statement that the Soviet Union did not define "national technical means" of intelligence gathering as broadly as did the United States. This, Mr. Sarbanes suggested, may make it difficult for the United States to complain about possible violations of the treaty's provision that neither side may interfere with such national means.

Soviet Attitude Seems Unclear

Secretary Brown said Soviet officials "do not accept" intelligence-gathering systems and stations deployed in third countries as national technical means of the United States. His testimony did not make clear the Soviet attitude toward intelligence-gathering ships and planes operating on or over international waters.

The absence of an agreed definition of "national technical means" may become an issue since the Soviet Union may not feel constrained to interfere if it regards facilities in third countries as not constituting such national means.

Regarding concern that Soviet violations might go undetected, Mr. Brown said: "To have a good chance of remaining undetected, any Soviet cheating would have to be on so small a scale that it would not be militarily significant."

Secretary Brown was questioned about a report today in The New York Times that some senators were concerned that the treaty allowed the Russians to deploy up to five intercontinental land-based missiles now under development.

He answered that, in addition to one entirely new missile, the treaty did permit changes in existing missiles within a 5 percent range of some characteristics.

Such changes would not be "militarily significant," he said, even if they were 10 or 15 percent of some characteristics such as launch-weight and throw-weight. The launch-weight is a missile's weight on launching; the throw-weight is the weight it can deliver to a target.

Glenn Stresses Present Capability

The Defense Secretary said the Soviet Union could not be certain that American monitoring would not be refined enough to detect any violation of the 5 percent provision. But Senator Glenn said the United States should be able to verify the treaty by systems that exist now rather than depend on systems still under development.

Today's testimony followed a closed session yesterday when Secretary Brown discussed secret aspects of United States monitoring capabilities. Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, will testify on the same subject in closed session next Tuesday.

In answer to questions by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, Secretary Brown said that a long series of test firings was needed to develop a new or significantly improved weapon and that the chances of any unauthorized improvements going undetected "is not as high as one in a million."

While marginal improvements through cheating are widely assumed to be possible, a more serious question is whether the Russians could "break out" of the treaty constraints with rapidly deployed new strategic strength.

Both Secretary Brown and Dr. William

J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, said that there was little danger of the sudden appearance of many new missile launchers and that it takes several years between the time a missile is first tested and the time it is deployed.

Mr. Brown made the point that the treaty provisions prohibiting deliberate concealment of deployment as well as interference with national technical means also made it easier in general to gather intelligence about the Soviet Union than would be the case without a treaty.